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Technology-facilitated sexual violence is a violation unique to the digital age that extends the 
analog-era rape culture, but electronic privacy invasions are often an overlooked part of these 
violations.  This article examines three emblematic cases of information privacy violations that get 
used, framed, or rationalized in connection with violations of sexual privacy.  In showing how 
aggressive electronic intrusions borrow the well-worn tropes of rape culture, we show how 
violations of sexual and information privacy are linked in the digital age.  Digital violations of both 
sexual and information privacy are impacted simultaneously by rape culture and surveillance culture, 









Modern information and communication technologies have created a whole new frontier for 
the surveillance of consumers, students, and political activists.  Indeed, we now live in a 
“surveillance society,” where location tracking, facial recognition, and monitoring of political and 
consumption patterns are everyday realities; many forms of individual and group data are collected 
for the purpose of governing, regulating, managing, or influencing what people do in the future 
(Surveillance Studies Network, n.d.).  These technologies have also multiplied the ways in which a 
person can both express their sexuality and be stalked, harassed, and sexually assaulted (Clough 
2016).   
The same portable and remote-access technologies that allow for new, technology-facilitated 
forms of sexual violence also allow for relatively easy and inexpensive data searches and seizures—
a privacy invasion that we will call dataraid.  And yet while feminist scholars have been concerned 
with technology-facilitated sexual violence, they have not addressed digital privacy invasions as 
such—even when they occur as part of technology-facilitated sexual violence.  Similarly, although 
information privacy advocates have worked to protect against theft or exposure of our digital 
information, they have not considered the parallels with technology-facilitated sexual violence.  
Recent work has asked scholars studying surveillance and privacy to pay more attention to feminist 
concerns about gender and other forms of inequality (Dubrofsky & Magnet, 2015), but this paper 
also urges feminist scholars to pay more attention to privacy in a surveillance society.  We will show 
that, in the digital age, sexual and information privacy converge, and both rape culture and 
surveillance culture reinforce one another. 
We first review technology-facilitated sexual violence and then move into the subject of 
dataraid by presenting three exemplary cases of information privacy invasions or dataraid that show 




the breadth, impact, and power relations they involve: (1) a data company’s capture of a woman’s 
pictures she sent from a laptop; (2) the police warrantless seizure and search of computer files of a 
professor employed at a public university (who is also an author of this paper), which is one of the 
first cases of its kind to make national news; and (3) the search of text messages between state 
employees using workplace-issued pagers.  In all three cases, sexuality came into focus and 
informed how the targets of dataraid were treated: the woman’s pictures were sexually intimate; the 
professor’s computer was searched for obscenity after the computer was confiscated in order to find 
anti-rape activists; and the state employee’s pager contained sexually explicit text messages.  Of 
course, countless cases of information privacy invasions exist (see Cannatasi et al., 2016; “Privacy”, 
nd.; Kerr et al., 2009; Orenstein, 2017) and thus these three cases barely scratch the surface.  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to survey all cases or, even more broadly, discuss the differential 
impact of surveillance on people situated differently across multiple axes of power and privilege.  
We discuss these three cases to give an idea as to the range of issues and people who are subject to 
these digital invasions and to draw attention to dataraid as well as the cultural assumptions that 
enable its perpetuation and acceptance, calling attention to sexualized invasions of privacy and 
highlighting the ways in which rape culture and surveillance culture have become mutually 
reinforcing.  Likewise, we show how a violence against women framework helps us better 
understand (and challenge) dataraid, particularly that which involves sexually explicit material and 
relies on the tropes of our rape culture.    
INVASIONS OF PRIVACY AS ACTS OF POWER 
Gender-motivated attacks that were, prior to the digital era, often focused on flesh-and-blood 
bodies and committed person-to-person, face-to-face, are now also carried out in virtual spaces or 
directed at people (primarily women) in physical spaces using technology (see Anderson & Cermele, 




2014; Fisher, 2016; Powell & Henry, 2017; Vera-Gray, 2017).  For example, Vera-Gray (2017) 
found that women in online public spaces suffer much abuse from men there, and argues that such 
technology-facilitated harassment must be understood as an online extension of traditional forms of 
stranger intrusion in physical spaces (such as street harassment) and, thus, “...within a violence-
against-women frame” (p. 67).  Technology-facilitated sexual violence can take place in private or 
public spaces, on physical bodies or virtual bodies, by an anonymous perpetrator or a known one. In 
all cases, it is characterized by an imbalance of power, a lack of consent, and a context of a rape-
supportive environment.   
Almost all behaviors, including sexual behaviors, are now technologically mediated, and as 
long as people have been having consensual cybersex, there have been nonconsensual versions of 
the same.  In the early days of the Internet, the term “cyberrape” emerged in both popular culture and 
academic literature to describe the use of one’s online game avatar to rape another’s avatar in virtual 
communities (see, e.g., Dibbel, 1995, Michals 1999).  Back then, such acts were body-less.  Today a 
much wider range of information and communication technologies are being used to perpetrate acts 
of sexual violence and exploitation.  Moreover, technology-facilitated sexual violence now includes 
installing spywear in the target’s home or buying and selling computers with remote-access 
technology built in so as to view or make secret-camera porn videos of the person who is 
unknowingly using the infected device.  It further includes the nonconsensual sharing of intimate 
and private images of a person (including “revenge porn”, “involuntary porn”, and rape memes), and 
the use of small digital cameras for video voyeurism (such as taking up-skirt fetish photos or 
“creepshots” of women in public).  These acts not only extend rape culture to our virtual spaces but 
also bring new technologies into our private physical spaces—even whilst not physically touching 
the bodies of their targets. 




Technology-facilitated sexual violence, then, encompasses a wide variety of intrusive acts in 
which some technological method is used to invade someone’s sexual privacy, defined as “the social 
norms (behaviors, expectations, and decisions) that govern access to, and information about, 
individuals’ intimate lives” (Citron, 2019, p. 1874).  It is beyond the scope of this paper to catalog all 
of the ways someone can use technology to facilitate sexual violence or to distinguish between 
which forms are actionable under which laws and policies in which countries.  The important point, 
for our purposes, is that these acts use technology to hack into the private physical space of the 
targeted person.  
Feminist scholars would likely agree that the starting point for a definition of rape is that a 
person’s body is penetrated sexually without that person giving consent, and penetration can be by 
an object or a body part.  Feminists expanded what counts as rape, such as in Robin Warshaw’s 1988 
book I Never Called It Rape, which argued, over many people’s objections, that date or acquaintance 
rape is a violation that should be included in the scope of rape.  The notion of technology-facilitated 
sexual violence extends the domain of sexual violence to the digital environment.  We do not 
suggest that these acts are the same as sexual assault in physical spaces, but at the same time we do 
not dismiss them as insignificant or as disembodied harms.   
The targets of technologically-facilitated sexual misconduct suffer real-world consequences.  
One study found that a sample of survivors of cyber-sexual assault had nearly the same trauma 
symptomatology (e.g., trauma guilt, emotional dysregulation, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
depression) as survivors of sexual assault in traditional settings (Holladay, 2016).  For example, 
Paris Hilton, whose infamous sex video was shared across the web without her consent in 2003 (the 
first widely known act of revenge porn), did not speak of the violation until 2017, when she said, “I 
could not leave my house for months.  I was so depressed, humiliated.  I didn’t want to be seen in 




public” (Carmon, 2017, para. 22).  In some cases, such as revenge porn where the material is sent to 
and seen by hundreds, or even hundreds of thousands of people, the emotional distress can be 
particularly acute and unending (Holladay, 2016).  Survivors of revenge porn reported feelings of 
betrayal and a loss of trust, as well as depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder, and loss of self-esteem, confidence, and control (Bates, 2017). 
It might already be clear that technology-facilitated sexual violence involves and requires 
digital privacy invasions—e.g., having your intimate images captured without your knowledge 
because you’re using a computer infected with spyware, or finding that the nude pictures you shared 
consensually with one person are now being shared nonconsensually with millions of people because 
a hacker got into your SnapChat account, as actress Jennifer Lawrence experienced (Farrell, 2014).  
In these cases, breaching digital information privacy is part of the aggressive project of technology-
facilitated sexual violence.  Such an event is not only psychologically distressing (Clough, 2016) but 
can also been seen an invasion of privacy (Citron, 2019; Clough, 2016; Franks, 2017; Šepec, 2019) 
as well as a compromise to the sexual integrity and identity of the victim (Šepec, 2019).    
Whereas law enforcement recognizes cyber-stalking as a problem precisely because it carries 
a threat of physical harm, no physical bodily boundaries or material possessions are violated in many 
cases of digital privacy intrusions.  This can create the illusion of lesser or no harm.  Yet for targets 
of remote-access technology that spy on people via the camera on their device, finding out that 
others have been watching them is terribly unsettling.  Despite unshared dimensions of rape in 
physical space and cyberspace, the cyber-perpetration can be experienced as genuinely intrusive, 
unethical, controlling, and even violent—as is rape in physical space.  While rape in physical space 
impacts the physical body in ways that sexual violence in cyberspace does not, the harm of both, to 
some extent, is to the self invested in that body—whether that body is a physical entity or a 




culturally designated place.  The social rules creating the boundaries of our embodied identities in 
virtual places mirror the social rules creating the boundaries of our embodied identities in physical 
spaces, and, of course, the feelings of vulnerability and empowerment in virtual places are not 
necessarily separable from those in our physical spaces.   
Technology-facilitated sexual violence is now an area of public concern—indeed, a moral 
panic over girls’ sexting and their susceptibility to such abuse emerged in the last decade (Hasinoff, 
2015).  It is also now an area of scholarly study, and is a feminist issue insofar as it takes place 
within a broader context of online misogyny and harassment, reveals a social tolerance of sexual 
violence against women, and therefore stems from and supports rape culture (see Backe et al, 2018; 
Crooks, 2018; Powell & Henry, 2017).  We do not suggest that the wide variety of nonconsensual 
forms of technology-facilitated sexual violence all constitute the same kind of crime, harm, or lived 
experience, nor are we legal scholars trying to make a legal argument.  Our point, rather, is simply 
that technology-facilitated sexual violence extends an analog-era problem, and further, that sexually 
aggressive online banter, online game add-ons and hacks that allow players to simulate rapes, and 
rape memes1 all provide a climate supportive of abuse because they normalize more extreme actions 
along a continuum of online violence (Powell & Henry, 2017). 
The “Marines United” Facebook page, exposed in 2017, illustrates the intensely personal 
boundary violations and power dynamic of technology-facilitated sexual violence, where active-duty 
and veteran male Marines posted and viewed nonconsensually taken or obtained nude photos of 
female service personnel (“Nude photo scandal rampant…”, 2017).  Various states and organizations 
disagree on where to draw legal lines in cases like this.  For instance, when a fraternity at Penn State 
                                               
1 See Dahl (2013) for an account of a rape victim’s suicide after her rape was turned into 
a mocking meme that spread widely across the Internet. 




in 2015 was engaged in a similar practice sharing nonconsensually obtained images over social 
media, they argued, successfully, and in agreement with the ACLU’s position, that the images were 
meant as satire rather than to harass, and were therefore not against the state’s nonconsensual 
pornography law (Franks, 2017).  Our point is not to enter a debate with lawmakers, but to 
emphasize how feminists can frame these actions as privacy violations in furtherance of an act of 
power.2  Specifically, modern information and communication technologies make images of nude 
people easy to obtain and share, which underscores the point of these actions by the fraternity or the 
Marines being that they are non-consensual acts of power.  After all, neither Marines nor college 
fraternity brothers would have any trouble finding images of women who freely share their own 
semi-nude selfies on social media or who consensually make pornographic images and videos 
available.  The point is that they took and shared non-consensually obtained images, those that 
violate women’s boundaries.  As Franks (2017) puts it, “Treating nonconsensual pornography as a 
harassment issue instead of a privacy issue demotes the harm it causes from an invasion of privacy 
to something more akin to hurt feelings,” which is “a misguided and patronizing approach.”    
To be sure, not all privacy violations in furtherance of an act of power are sexual.  The digital 
privacy invasions where technology is used to hack into or otherwise access a person’s digital files 
or digital presence considered to be private has been labeled colloquially “datarape” (see, e.g., 
“datarape”, 2015).  While such a term may be crass and insensitive to sufferers of physical 
invasions, it is no coincidence that such aggressive, nonconsensual invasions of privacy have been so 
                                               
2 While the targets of cyberrape in this example are women, LGBTQ+ individuals are 
frequently targeted (see, e.g., “Tyler Clementi’s Story”, n.d.).  Heterosexual cis-men 
have been targeted as well (see, e.g., Crocker, 2014).   
 




labeled.  We use the term “dataraid” instead, and argue that as technology-facilitated sexual violence 
is gendered, so too is dataraid, in the dynamics around power, violence, and victimization, which 
bell hooks (2015) describes as patriarchal violence—that is, where violence is regarded as an 
acceptable means of social control, regardless of the gender of perpetrator or victim.  To be clear, the 
target of dataraid is not the technology itself (e.g., the computer or smartphone being accessed), but 
rather the individual whose technology, and therefore cyber-self, has been invaded or violated.  The 
digital presence or information considered to be private may or may not include sexually explicit 
images, chats, or details.  Our focus here, though, is when and how dataraid is sexualized.  As our 
case studies show, people invoke the well-worn tropes of rape culture to understand, and rationalize, 
the aggressive intrusion into people’s private digital spaces.   
It is within this feminist approach that our argument is grounded: that intrusions into our 
technological data or data-selves can be understood theoretically, practically, and affectively in 
connection with acts of bodily rape in the physical world, and to acts of technology-facilitated sexual 
violence that may more closely mirror traditional sexual assault.  Just as rape has been seen as an 
assertion of the assailant’s power through the violation, dataraid can—and, we argue, should—be 
understood as an assertion of power.  Further, a technological invasion can be intimate and personal, 
particularly when it is experienced or framed as sexual.  As technology has expanded, so have our 
technological selves; these aspects of the self are as personal and real as our flesh-and-blood bodies.  
In consequence, we can experience real harm online or through our digital presence.  Just as 
controlling one’s body and/or one’s sexuality is a privacy interest (Pracher, 1981, p. 745; Citron, 
2019), so, too, is controlling one’s technological self, particularly when the digitized information is 
about one’s body or sexuality.  Our point here is not that rape, technology-facilitated sexual 
violence, and dataraid are all the same experiences, in life or in law, but that analyzing them together 




can generate new insights about the convergence of information privacy and sexual privacy, and the 
discourses that rationalize aggressive privacy invasions.  Put another way, if we accept that 
technology-facilitated sexual violence is harmful in some way, and therefore want to combat the 
problem, it follows that we must better understand and challenge the dataraid that is so often a part 
of the intrusion. 
Privacy rights include a right to be protected from intrusion or harassment (Elshtain, 1997), 
but of course sexual privacy and information privacy are not exactly the same (see, e.g., Strahilevitz, 
2005; Citron, 2019).  Thus, we do not suggest that sexual privacy or sexual integrity is really 
information privacy, but rather that both the practice and the subjective experience of dataraid can be 
seen as analogous to the experience of bodily rape in physical space in the following ways:  the 
aggression targeted at one’s core identity; the power dynamic at play; how the act is feminizing 
(regardless of whom it targets); the betrayal and subsequent emotional and psychological outcomes 
experienced by those targeted; the way the violation limits one’s autonomy and ability to participate 
in civic life; and in the individual, social, and structural responses to the act.   
THE DATARAID IN TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
Individuals and groups using surveillance technologies to target people for sexualized 
purposes is a subset of the practices by individuals, governments, and corporations that target people 
through those same technologies for other purposes.  Technology-facilitated sexual violation 
dovetails with the violation of privacy that occurs when non-sexual forms of our online selves are 
violated, taken from us, or invaded without our express or affirmative consent.  Just as we argued 
that those who experience technology-facilitated sexual violence can be traumatized, those who find 
their electronic data raided can also experience the same sort of surreal blending of bodies and 
technologies, and thus experience those electronic searches as compromising their privacy, their 




dignity, their autonomy, and their very selves.  As with sexual violence in physical space, acts of 
sexual violence in cyberspace and dataraid are not just about harm, damage, or injury to one’s 
physical body or to one’s property, but about harm, damage, or injury to the self.   
While invading, taking, and sharing our (non-sexual) data without our consent may not 
overtly simulate an act of interpersonal violence in the material world, or necessarily involve 
intimate images or sexualized information, it can nonetheless be a violation or invasion both 
theoretically and tangibly similar to acts of sexual assault.  In drawing parallels between sexual 
violence in physical space, sexual violence in cyberspace, and dataraid, we do not suggest they are 
or ought to be indistinguishable in life or in law.  It may be easy enough for people to see the parallel 
between rape and “cyberrape”, but when we consider dataraid alongside these, it becomes possible 
to understand the harm all these violations have in common: boundary violations and the invasion of 
privacy.  While we have seen more and more forms of technology-facilitated sexual violence 
become punishable by law, we have arguably seen our protections against dataraid dramatically 
eroded.  Examining a number of cases here will illustrate how and why dataraid and sexual violence 
can be seen as mutually shaping forces and discourses.  Put differently, technology-facilitated sexual 
violence is enabled by a rape culture that has moved online (a cyberrape culture), and digital 
intrusions are enabled by a surveillance culture, in which we take for granted the digital invasions of 
privacy in general, and now surveillance culture and rape culture mutually reinforce one another.  
We turn now to three cases of dataraid, showing how the rationalizations for these aggressive 
intrusions borrow the well-worn tropes of rape culture, and how rape culture and surveillance culture 
work together to rationalize violations of information and sexual privacy. 
Case 1: Corporate Remote-Access Spyware on Laptop 




Susan Clements-Jeffrey, a substitute teacher in Springfield, Ohio, United States, bought a 
laptop in 2008 from a high school student where she worked, not knowing that the student himself 
had purchased it from someone else who had stolen it.  The school district that had purchased the 
laptops had a contract with Absolute Software, Inc, a theft recovery service that gathered 
information to try to identify the user of a stolen machine.  Believing her communications over her 
password-protected laptop to be secure, Clements-Jeffrey had exchanged sexually explicit messages 
and photos with her long-distance boyfriend, Carlton Smith, via her laptop’s camera while in her 
home.  Absolute ran remote-access software, LoJack for Laptops, designed to help people recover 
stolen computers, and had Clements-Jeffrey’s computer download certain software that allowed 
remote access to her machine and files in real time without her knowledge.  Absolute then 
discovered the sexually explicit photos, and furnished them to the police.  Police showed up at 
Clements-Jeffrey’s house in search of the stolen computer, showing her the sexually explicit photos 
of herself, mocking her, and calling her stupid (Massoglia, 2014).   
One issue in this case is a person’s having a reasonable expectation of privacy per the 4th 
Amendment in/on a device that was stolen if they did not know it was stolen, which a federal judge 
affirmed in 2011 (Welsh-Huggins, 2011).  The other issue is how Clements-Jeffrey was treated by 
both the Absolute employees and the police.  Neither furnishing sexually explicit webcam images, 
nor mocking and humiliating her, were necessary for recovering the laptop or identifying its thief.  
Clements-Jeffrey and Carlton Smith sued both the Springfield police and Absolute, arguing that they 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their computer communications.  By 2011, Absolute had 
settled with Clements-Jeffrey and Smith, providing an undisclosed sum (Welsh-Huggins, 2011).  
The accessing and downloading of her sexually explicit photos by Absolute, and the harassment she 
experienced at the hands of the police, are noteworthy in their unnecessariness; it seems unlikely that 




photos of her cat or webcamming with her sick mother would have resulted in this same treatment.  
Instead, her sexuality was immediately targeted as a way to punish her for having presumably stolen 
the laptop, or simply to help the Absolute workers and police officers intimidate Clements-Jeffrey.3  
Case 2: Police Search and Seizure of Computer Files 
A second case involved a professor, Martha McCaughey (also an author of this paper), whose 
workplace computer was seized and searched by campus police in 2002.4  This event became 
national news because, at that time, such situations were still relatively new and people did not know 
how to articulate what harm had been done.  Precipitating this event was a group of protesters spray-
painting anti-rape graffiti across sidewalks and buildings on the campus of a U.S. public university 
where the professor was employed.  Some hours later, a group claiming responsibility for the graffiti 
sent an anonymous e-mail "manifesto" defending the group's act of property defacement as 
politically necessary given the problem of rape.  The manifesto indicated no future action or plans to 
deface more property or hurt people.  One such recipient was McCaughey who, in her capacity as 
Director of the Women's Studies Program, forwarded the message (with an explanatory preface) to 
her colleagues on the program’s listserv because such current events often get discussed in their 
classes.  Although the email manifesto said that the Women’s Studies Director was one of several 
                                               
3 To be clear, neither exposure of a sexual nature nor involvement of a female target are 
requirements for a situation to be dataraid.  For instance, a man described feeling 
invaded when photographs, log messages, and screenshots were captured by a similar 
remote-access technology, even though the photos captured him playing poker (see 
Massoglia, 2014, para. 13). 
4 This incident is described with regard to academic freedom, but not with regard to 
violence against women or as dataraid, in McCaughey (2003). 




people being sent the manifesto because she was perceived by the senders to be sympathetic to their 
cause, she neither claimed nor denied any sympathy for their manifesto or form of protest.   
In forwarding the email to her colleagues, McCaughey attracted the attention of the campus 
police, who wanted the message to trace its origin and catch the senders/vandals.  Some days later, a 
campus detective asked the professor for her entire computer to perform an email recovery 
operation.  Despite her refusal to hand over her entire computer and files, uniformed armed police 
officers later appeared at her campus office and confiscated the computer with all her files on it.  
When McCaughey asked for a search warrant, the officers told her that they did not have or need a 
warrant because the computer was university property.  Of course, the professor’s own electronic 
files saved on the computer were distinct from the machine itself--the object that was university 
property.  The police and the University strategically ignored this distinction, took the machine, and 
copied the entire harddrive before returning the computer to the professor’s office. 
Confiscating an entire computer hard drive to access one email message meant copying thirty 
gigabytes of information to get a four-kilobyte email file from the anti-rape graffiti spray-painters—
copying over 7.5 million times the information they needed.  Without a warrant, which would have 
limited the scope of the search, the police deemed everything on the computer fair game for 
searching.  The professor’s own counter-surveillance of her hard drive, once her computer was 
returned to her, revealed that the police had opened some of her files, including, for example, those 
saved with words like “WS Pictures” and “Sex Toy Parties”.  The searched documents were all part 
of bona fide research projects, most of them published already, and the file (suspiciously?) called 
“WS Pictures” was a file of photos of illustrious women (in their clothes), which had been on the 
program’s website.  The police later admitted to McCaughey that they had opened these files 
because they thought they might be obscene. 




Regarding the search for the sender of the anonymous email and the graffiti spraypainters, 
University tech specialists recovered the deleted email but were unable to trace it to any sender's 
computer.  The professor was never arrested, fired, or reprimanded on obscenity or any other 
charges; yet the confiscation of her computer files was disturbing for her personally and chilling for 
many of her colleagues.  Further, people reading about the case in some newspapers and magazines 
suggested that the professor ought not to have had an expectation of privacy in any electronic files 
stored on a state-issued computer in the first place, or was asking for the intrusion because she 
forwarded the email.  
The legitimating discourse paralleled almost exactly the very narratives that attempt to 
rationalize sexual assault: that a professor’s research on sexual and/or feminist topics renders her 
necessarily dataraid-able; that a professor who will not “cooperate” with the intrusion deserves what 
she gets (in other words, they would not have had to engage in the aggressive intrusion to get the 
data if she had not had the audacity to say ‘no’ in the first place); that a professor’s computer and the 
files stored thereon are not really her property, but that of her employer, making capricious computer 
searches and seizures the “right” of the state (much as rape was, until recently in American history, 
the “right” of the husband who, in a legal marriage, owned his wife); and, finally, that a professor 
being “loose” with her computer deserves the intrusion–as one commentator remarked, “in 
forwarding the offending e-mail to a Listserv, rather than simply deleting it, [the professor] can 
hardly argue that she was attempting to keep the whole matter private” (Sheilds, 2004, p. 6).  Her 
promiscuous forwarding of her email categorized her as a “cyber-slut”.  Clearly, dataraid is 
rationalized in terms of entitlement to access, and the victim is often blamed for inviting or 
deserving it.  When using a computer network itself sets one up as blameworthy, it is eerily similar 
to the bygone days when rape victims had to establish themselves as virgins to garner sympathy and 




avoid blame.  No act of sexual aggression was committed against the professor, but the aggressive, 
entitled invasion of privacy in this circumstance, coupled with the manner in which it was 
rationalized, reveals the parallels between virtual and physical privacy violations. 
Case 3: Employer Searches of Employees’ Text Messages 
Our final example is the 2010 case of police Sergeant Jeff Quon, whose case made “sexting” 
a household word.  Here, Sergeant Quon argued--unsuccessfully--that his employer, the Chief of 
Police in Ontario, California, U.S.A., had no right to read the text messages he had sent using his 
work-provided pager.  The police chief had decided to obtain and read the transcripts of text 
messages on the pagers of employees who had the highest data-use fees.  Sergeant Quon had 
dutifully paid any overage charges for his data use in excess of the city’s monthly character limit, but 
the Police Chief presumably wanted to see whether the city’s limit was too strict or what had caused 
the high usage fees.  The search revealed that Sergeant Quon had been sending sexually explicit text 
messages to both his wife and his girlfriend (also a coworker).  The police department’s policy made 
it clear that incidental personal use of the pagers was allowed and that the Police Chief told officers 
that their usage rates, but not message content, would be monitored.  Quon sued the city and the 
company, Arch Wireless, which had voluntarily provided the transcripts of the officer’s text 
messages, for invasion of privacy (Mears, 2010).  The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Quon case—in 
favor of the government employer—indicated that the police chief’s rifling through Sergeant Quon’s 
text messages was an allowable search because there was a business reason to conduct that search, 
although not because any data or communications on state-issued or employer-issued device cannot 
be private (Savage, 2010). 
One writer for the Chicago Tribune showed no sympathy for Sergeant Quon: “It takes a 
special kind of chutzpah to send sexually explicit messages on your employer-issued pager and then 




howl that your privacy was violated when you get caught.  Especially if you're a cop” (“No Sexting 
on the Job”, 2010, para. 1).  Here Quon is blamed for dataraid, arguably because he violated some 
expected norm of sexual propriety, in a manner similar to the way victims of rape are blamed.  The 
remark, “especially if you’re a cop”, is particularly interesting, and perhaps meant to imply that we 
should hold police officers to higher standards of conduct, although it is unclear if those standards 
are relating to personal use of professional technology or to sexual behavior.  But it might also 
reflect the mistaken belief, held by many, that, since cops are government employees, they ought not 
expect privacy.  However, like the public university professor in the previous example, government 
employees typically have more privacy protections than non-government employees precisely 
because the U.S. Constitution was designed to protect citizens from government intrusion.  As in 
Clements-Jeffrey’s case, it likely would have been an easier case had Quon been texting Bible 
quotes or writing bad poetry to his wife.  The revelation of intimate or embarrassing information is 
precisely what makes some people less sympathetic as targets of privacy invasion.    
 Even those who don’t have a mistress and don’t ever send sexy text messages usually use 
connected devices at home and at work.  Our superconnected culture now makes using one device 
for multiple purposes normal and sometimes even necessary.  Further, we can see that the targets of 
dataraid get blamed by suggesting that they either have no property rights or have loose sexual 
morals--in other words, that they deserved the intrusion.  In Quon’s case, it was both; some invoked 
Quon’s sexual morals to blame him, while others suggested that he had no right to privacy on a 
work-issued device.   
UNPACKING THE CASES:  UNDERSTANDING DATARAID IN CYBERRAPE CULTURE 
Dataraid is a power move: whether involving a person’s sexuality and sexual behaviors or 
not, it grabs private parts, spaces, or information and violates an individual’s sense of control in a 




way that has a real material and affective impact.  Technology studies scholars and body studies 
scholars have explained why someone would have an intimate connection with their digital 
information such that their exposure would feel like a real intrusion.  For example, Deborah 
Lupton’s (1995) early work on the “embodied computer/user” describes the emotional and embodied 
relationship that computer users have with their PCs; similarly, Elizabeth Grosz’s (1994) work 
describes a computer as a machine that is not separate from one’s body, but a prosthetic extension of 
it.  More recently, Irma van der Ploeg (2012, p. 177) describes our bodies as “defined in terms of 
information.  Who you are, how you are, and how you are going to be treated in various situations, is 
increasingly known to various agents and agencies through information deriving from your own 
body; information that is processed elsewhere, through the networks, databases, and algorithms of 
the information society”.  Indeed, today more than ever, our material bodies and networked 
technologies are inescapably entwined (Smith, 2016). 
Technology-facilitated sexual violence, and the rationalizations for it, extend modes of 
gendered power and control and blur boundaries between physical bodies and technobodies.  This 
analysis enables us to see that the harm of rape is not that it is done to a body, per se, but to a body-
self, and that the techno-self, virtual-self, or information body can be both gendered and violated in 
real and meaningful ways.  A sequelae of cyberrape is the production of an immediate, aesthetic, 
bodily affect; violation of the physical body is not required.  In a study of cyberporn, Zabet Patteson 
(2004) argues that pornography changes when it is viewed on the computer, because the technology 
itself carries an “affective charge” (p. 120) that embodies new forms of pleasure.  That particular 
affective charge, of course, is related to our existing categories of sexual and gendered experiences.  
That an invasion is done through technology and its related components does not mean there is no 
affective charge experienced by the person as a result of the intrusion.  




Just as living in a rape culture impacts one’s body and affect, so too does living in a 
cyberrape culture and a surveillance culture.  Indeed, online sexual activity—whether consensual 
activity like consuming online porn, sharing one’s nude selfies through social media, and using 
hookup apps like Tindr, or nonconsensual activity such as cyberstalking—is now so commonplace 
that it is a likely part of the subject formation and daily bodily habits of young people today (Puar, 
2011).  For these same reasons, living in a surveillance culture in which the very personal 
information we are encouraged to post or store in digital spaces can be hacked or otherwise taken 
and viewed without our consent has an impact on our overall affect and style of citizenship.   
In the case of the substitute teacher, private nude photos of a woman were taken by a tech 
company and given to the police, both traditionally and stereotypically masculine organizations, 
without reason, and without cause.  The perpetrators in the campus computer seizure case were the 
campus police and university administration, who embody a violent, entitled masculinity and 
stereotypically masculine traits when they seize and search someone’s data without consent, a 
warrant, or viable explanation.  The target’s cyber-self, the perpetrators clearly feel, is theirs for the 
taking.  It is not coincidental, and, in fact, would be almost comical if it were not horrifically ironic, 
that the professor was the target of a dataraid in the context of an investigation of people who were 
protesting rape in physical space.  Nor it is coincidental that the professor targeted for dataraid, and 
then subsequently investigated for obscenity, was a women’s studies professor presumably linked to 
anti-rape activism and suspected of having inappropriate sexual content on her computer.   
That Sergeant Quon is a man and that the perpetrator/perpetrating organization are 
male/masculine does not mean that the dataraid was not gendered or patriarchal.  The violation of 
Quon’s sexual privacy was rationalized with implicit appeals to normative expectations of gender 
and sexuality.  Quon was considered to have violated the norms of appropriate behavior around both 




the workplace and sexuality.  He was framed as having been inappropriately loose both with his 
sexuality and with his electronic device.  Through the invocation of the same blaming tactics 
typically used toward victims of rape and sexual assault, Quon was rendered an unsympathetic 
victim and blamed for the privacy violation.5  In the professor’s case, some suggested that she was 
being loose with her computer by forwarding the protester/vandal’s message to colleagues.  In 
Clements-Jeffrey’s case, some might still blame her for having expected that her intimate exchanges 
going across the Internet would be private or that, if she had stolen a computer then she would 
deserve the invasion of her sexual privacy.  The targets of dataraid get framed, in the vernacular of 
rape culture, as “asking for it” and deserving of no respect, privacy, or sympathy.   
Feminization is a mode, function, and effect of sexual violence (Mulder et al 2019).  Rape 
victimization is “a doubly feminine phenomenon: (a) because it entails (interpersonal) victimization, 
triggering associations of weakness and vulnerability traditionally associated with femininity and (b) 
because it forces the victim into a particular role within sexual relations that is typically allocated to 
the feminine party” (Mulder et al 2019, para 2).  On this basis rape is described as a gendering 
crime--one that has the potential to feminize its victims (Mardorossian, 2014). Sexual violence is a 
                                               
5 We note that readers might find it interesting or ironic that the target of this dataraid is 
himself a police officer, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to review literature on 
police officers’ participation in surveillance as opposed to their being objects of it.  We 
make no claim here about how often police officers get punished or get excused for 
actions that are illegal or perceived as morally wrong.  For a discussion of police culture, 
including the strains of having hostile and punitive supervisors, and the relationship 
between police officers’ attitudes toward their supervisors and citizens, see Terrill, et al 
(2003). 




feminizing experience for the victim, regardless of the sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation of 
the people involved; blaming victims for their assaults, in general or as a function of having traits 
such as “a trusting nature” or “poor judgment”, involves seeing those same victims as more 
feminine, regardless of the gender identity of the victims (Howard 1984, p. 274).  The issue of 
victim blame is complicated (see Davies & Rogers, 2006 for a review of the literature), with beliefs 
about masculinity impacting beliefs about male victims in particular with respect to attributions of 
cause, blame, responsibility, and victim status.  Thus rape, whether in cyberspace or physical space, 
is a gendered act.  It stands to reason that dataraid is victimizing, and feminizing, in a parallel 
fashion.  In cases of cyberrape and dataraid, our digital bodies, files, and personae—digital 
representations of self—are violated.  In the process we and our files are treated as up for grabs, 
much the same way as feminized bodies in physical space are treated as up for grabs, literally and 
figuratively.     
In these three cases, the targets are sexualized/gendered, and revealed or constructed as 
sexual beings—an element that almost automatically ruins one’s credibility and claim to civil 
liberties, regardless of gender identity or sexual orientation.  If Quon’s texts were not sexts but, say, 
Bible quotes or recipes, would people have been less likely to blame him?  If the professor’s 
computer was full of quantum physics files rather than women’s studies files would she have been 
subjected to the additional searches that were unrelated to the original investigation?  Would people 
have been more sympathetic to the dataraid target if no seemingly salacious files were on their 
computer?  Rape culture’s pull to blaming the victim leads people to be suspicious of anyone who 
seems like a sexual being—at least, when the sexual being is the target of an aggressive invasion of 
privacy.   




While doing something sexual might repeal potential sympathy in a dataraid case, simply 
doing something technological may be enough for people to blame the victim.  The targets of 
dataraid we described were framed as cybersluts—people who are loose with their data, devices, or 
computers (in addition to, in some cases, their sexuality).  Such cybersluttiness made it even easier, 
in a (cyber)rape culture and a surveillance culture, to claim that the dataraid targets were “asking for 
it.”  Another parallel to rape culture lies in the exhausting work people are expected to do in order to 
avoid predation.  In his essay on the burdensome work of being surveilled, Smith (2016) describes 
the efforts people make to anticipate and mitigate their vulnerability in the context of the 
“involuntary visibility” of surveillance culture.  Smith’s description of such efforts, and the ways our 
neoliberal society expects individuals to bear the burden of self-protection, reads remarkably like 
women’s accounts of their experiences living in a rape culture.  
Regardless of the gendered or sexual nature of the targets, images, or messages, privacy has 
its own value, and intrusions into privacy are experienced as violations.  Violations of the privacy we 
expect to be afforded in the technological extensions or ourselves and our identity constitute what 
we call dataraid.  Precisely because privacy has value, separate from the nature of any specific act a 
person might want to keep private, we can imagine being disturbed if, while doing something as 
mundane as cooking dinner, someone was standing outside our kitchen window watching us do it.  
Similarly, perfectly good workers might not want their employer spying on them through the 
company computers, even though they have nothing to hide, just as people might not want their 
bosses dropping by their houses unannounced to check on their behavior outside of work hours.  The 
academic freedom professors are afforded requires a certain amount of privacy so that they can 
conduct their scholarship without interference from government, corporate, or political interest 




groups.6  As we hope our examples in this article have illustrated, such surveillance not only 
compromises one’s privacy, but affects one’s actions and creates psychological harm, whether or not 
it harms the physical body, just as stalking is now recognized as an invasion of privacy that creates 
psychological harm, even if no physical contact with the target is made.   
Many would argue that if people like Ms. Clements-Jeffreys or the professor had “nothing to 
hide” then they should not have cared who might be watching them remotely.  This “nothing to 
hide” argument is based on mistaken views about what it means to protect privacy and the costs and 
benefits of doing so.  Proponents of this argument believe that privacy is unnecessary when people 
are behaving appropriately, and that violating privacy is a small price to pay in order to expose the 
illegal or dangerous behavior of others (Solove, 2013).  This is a false dichotomy; for example, 
activists, minorities, and citizens who might one day feel compelled to question a government, 
corporate, or community practice will need privacy from government surveillance and intrusion.  
This example is not hypothetical; in September of 2017, the Department of Justice under the Trump 
Administration sought to force Facebook to release the account information of individuals they 
deemed to be “anti-administration activists” (Schneider, 2017, para. 2).  
IMPLICATIONS:  UNDERSTANDING AND CHALLENGING DATARAID AND 
CYBERRAPE TOGETHER    
To claim that technology-facilitated sexual violence is a feminist issue probably requires no 
justification, even when we acknowledge that not all of these types of violations hurt a physical 
body.  We have attempted to establish that there is a dataraid dimension to many cyberrapes, and 
                                               
6 For an excellent synopsis of the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision on the 
importance of the privacy of email communication among public university professors, 
see Halpern (2014). 




that the tropes of (cyber)rape culture get invoked to rationalize dataraid.  Surveillance and digital 
intrusions reflect and perpetuate the abuses of power that feminists oppose.  An intersectional 
feminist lens helps us see dataraid as a potential extension of (cyber)rape culture.  And, just as 
feminist analyses have helped lawmakers and others come to terms with the fact that physical harm 
is not the necessary or only harm in technology-facilitated sexual violence, feminist analyses can 
help show how and why financial harm is not the only harm caused in cases of dataraid, and that 
physical privacy is not the only form of privacy to expect or to be violated.  Privacy around one’s 
sexual boundaries, so necessary for a sense of agency and control over one’s own intimate and 
sexual life, now often goes hand-in-hand with electronic privacy.  
Despite the obvious connection between interpersonal violence and privacy (rape violates 
bodily privacy, escaping a batterer requires the right to be left alone, and new technologies require 
information privacy to be safe from such abuses), feminists have had a conflicted relationship with 
privacy.  Prior to feminists identifying rape as a structured social practice rather than a personal 
trouble, as an act of domination and a crime fueled by a rape-supportive environment or rape culture 
(Brownmiller, 1975; MacKinnon, 1989; Renzetti et al., 2017), rape, especially marital rape, was 
often considered a private matter (Pracher, 1981).  Feminists criticized the way women suffered 
under imposed privacy in the home, where the domestic and sexual abuse of women and children 
were hidden (“Gender and Electronic Privacy”, n.d.; Furedi, 2004, p. 72).  Feminists understandably 
feared that the most socially, economically, and politically vulnerable people--such as women and 
children--would be harmed if the most powerful people--such as adult men--were free from 
government intrusion.  As Cohen (1997, p. 135) points out, “as innumerable feminists have insisted, 
the public/private dichotomy has thereby served to reinforce and perpetuate social hierarchies and 
inequity between the sexes in all spheres of life.”  Thus, even while privacy is necessary for women 




escaping abuse, feminists have often been skeptical of privacy as a place of refuge, viewing it 
instead as a shield for destructive behavior that harms women and children.  Feminists have thus 
sometimes seen government intrusions into people’s private lives and information as helpful in 
protecting the vulnerable.   
And yet privacy has also been critical for women’s escape from violence.  Going to shelters 
in secret locations, for example, has been key for women’s ability to leave abusers safely.  The 
ability to maintain their own privacy and anonymity is critical for women, given how 21st Century 
technologies enable abusers to surveille, threaten, and control their victims.  Privacy is not only 
spatial (privacy in one’s physical space), and physical (bodily privacy); it includes decisional 
autonomy and information autonomy as well.  Privacy rights secure our ability to develop intact 
identities of our own (Cohen, 1997, p. 154).  Seen in relation to one another, understandings of 
control, identity, and intimacy provide that a definition of privacy involves "control over the 
intimacies of [one's] personal identity" (Gerety, 1977, as cited in Pracher, 1981, p. 743).  In this way, 
privacy protects the essential aspects of our selfhood by presuming a boundary between one’s 
intimate life and public life.  And sexual privacy, as Citron (2019, p. 1874) puts it, “sits at the apex 
of privacy values because of its importance to sexual agency, intimacy, and equality.”   
Jennifer Doyle (2015) and Laura Kipnis (2017) have criticized those feminist anti-rape 
advocates who have uncritically aligned themselves with state security and protection measures that 
unilaterally limit people’s rights to privacy.  More broadly, programs of state surveillance 
complement state violence and disproportionately control people of color, who have historically 
been regarded as the “dangerous classes” in need of surveillance, not privacy (Roberts & Vagle, 
2016).  Indeed, contemporary surveillance technologies and practices have been linked historically 
to surveilling and policing Blacks under slavery, such as through branding and lantern laws 




(Browne, 2015).  Through this lens, enhancing state surveillance powers leads to the abuse of the 
more marginalized members of society, particularly racial and ethnic minorities, people with 
disabilities, and poor people (Elshtain, 1997).  Privacy, then, is a value necessary for the autonomy, 
choice, and social participation that intersectional feminism espouses, and a lens through which both 
technology-facilitated sexual violence and dataraid can be understood and challenged.   
Sensitivity to abuses of power and inequality are hallmarks of feminist analysis.  Feminists 
have emphasized the importance of affirmatively expressed consent in the context of face-to-face 
rape.  We could readily apply the decades-old chant that “yes means yes and no means no” to users 
of networked systems in order to highlight the importance of clear and simple privacy terms with 
opt-in and opt-out choices, and the need for companies and other organizations to seek and confirm 
the consent of a person, for example, to publish identifying information.  Likewise, feminists are 
particularly insightful when it comes to debates about what constitutes meaningful consent, and 
could help answer questions surrounding, for instance: when consent to being photographed or 
videotaped occurs; when exposing parts of one’s body (or other personal information) is consensual 
and when it is not; and how extensive such consent can be.  Feminists can help understand and 
oppose online privacy violations as such, challenging the patronizing self-esteem-based 
interventions women and girls receive, which ultimately blame them for online victimization (see 
Hasinoff, 2015).  A feminist analysis can help explain to perplexed attorneys, investigators, and 
others that, for example, a voluntary display of something “private” to ten people when done live at 
Mardi Gras is still not the same as being videotaped without one’s consent and having one’s 
videotaped image broadcast to millions of people or to sell a “Girls Gone Wild” video (see Stech, 
2014).   




Some feminist scholars have already challenged state or administrative overreach in some 
cases of sexual violence in physical space, arguing that securing a safe place for women must not 
come at the price of civil liberties (Kipnis, 2017).  They have also challenged the notion that being a 
sexual subject removes one’s innocence or possibility of being a victim of sexual violence (Doyle, 
2015).  This type of analysis offers a promising parallel for cyberspace, and might be applied to 
computer privacy and dataraid as well.  Posting sexually explicit images in a way that is consensual, 
or sharing information of any kind through digital information and communication technologies, 
does not make one too “loose” to have a legitimate expectation of privacy and a complaint about 
dataraid.   
Further, in line with critiques of state surveillance against the marginalized (Browne, 2015; 
Roberts & Vagle, 2016), feminist investment in our online liberties would make feminists more 
careful not to support policies and laws that trample cyberliberties as they attempt to keep women 
(or others) safe from new forms of violation.  An example of overlooking a constitutional right in an 
attempt to protect victims can be seen when, as the Violence Against Women Act was reauthorized 
in 2013, the U.S. Congress redefined what actions constituted cyberharassment, casting such a wide 
net that simply causing substantial emotional distress (to the victim or the victim’s immediate 
family) would now count as harassing someone online.  This winds up threatening those who wish to 
speak up over social media about abuse or other social injustices as that could be construed as 
causing emotional distress (Fakhoury, 2013).  In 2011 the federal anti-stalking law was applied to a 
man who posted criticism of a public figure on Twitter (U.S. v. Cassidy, 2012).  While a federal 
judge dismissed the indictment on First Amendment grounds (Volokh, 2012), there is reason to 
worry these laws will be abused.   




Feminists might find common cause with cyberliberties groups in other ways as well.  Just as 
some feminists have emphasized the advantages of resisting sexual victimization through 
empowered resistance strategies such as self-defense (McCaughey & Cermele, 2015), electronic 
privacy advocates like the Electronic Frontier Foundation offer cyber-self-defense measures for 
encrypting one’s data, and increasing awareness of ways to safeguard one’s privacy rights.  
Although individual approaches to one’s security in cyberspace have been criticized as neo-liberal 
fixes that neglect to target the perpetrating organization (see, e.g., Smith 2016), feminist self-defense 
scholars have argued that advocating such measures can be accompanied by strategies that target 
perpetrators.  Feminist self-defense scholars, in joining the conversation about cyber-self-defense, 
would offer important insights to ensure that those cyber-self-defense recommendations do not 
parallel the recommendations in physical space that fail to connect with broader social changes or 
that constrict women’s freedom and mobility.  Just as in physical space, people in cyberspace can 
engage in cyber-self-defense that allows them freedom, autonomy, and agency, in ways that 
challenge rather than support the (cyber)rape culture.  Indeed, Powell and Henry (2017, p. 254) 
argue that any cyber-self-defense strategies against technology-assisted sexual violence “must 
promote gender and digital equality”.   
As feminists know all too well when it comes to narratives around rape prevention, telling 
people who do not want to expose themselves to surveillance simply not to use information and 
communication technologies, even while these dominate our social world, takes for granted as 
inevitable the culture of predation and places undue burden on the potential victim.  Advocating for 
information privacy need not make one anti-technology, just as fighting against rape need not make 
one anti-sex.  When people get used to the invasions of electronic privacy that technologies have 
made so easy to accomplish, they risk coming to accept them as normal, inevitable, and necessary, 




akin to resigning ourselves to the inevitability of (cyber)rape in a (cyber)rape culture.  Just as there is 
a link between one’s bodily autonomy and one’s autonomy in our civil society, such a link exists 
between our informational privacy and our autonomy.  A woman’s (or anyone’s) ability to determine 
when and how information about her is shared with others—whether that is through location 
tracking or other forms of surveillance based on our online activities, sexual or not—is a feminist 
issue.   
Feminists historically opposed rape not because, circa the 18th Century, a woman was a 
man’s property or the vagina a sacred flower, but because feminists value self-determination, 
autonomy, freedom, respect for boundaries, and privacy as necessary for full citizenship in a 
participatory democracy.  For these very reasons, feminists have a powerful role to play in 
articulating and protecting online privacy rights, just as privacy advocates have a powerful role to 
play in opposing technology-facilitated sexual violence as invasions of sexual privacy.  
Acknowledging the parallels between cyberrape and dataraid not only helps protect civil liberties in 
an age of surveillance but also helps us see the harm in sexually aggressive violations as well.  Put 
differently, our framework makes explicit the violation of boundaries and personal integrity in 
dataraid whilst highlighting the dataraid involved in technology-facilitated sexual violence.  
Understanding technology-facilitated sexual violence and dataraid as related forms of digital 
victimization could help scholars understand various forms of privacy invasion that disable 
autonomy and social participation.  In today’s digital surveillance culture, any defense of someone’s 
sexual privacy online must necessarily also promote their information privacy online as well.  
Feminists and privacy advocates together might find a balance between privacy and safety as they 
work to protect every person’s autonomy over the core components of their selfhood.    
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